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AVIATION SAFETY AS A FUNCTION OF PILOT EXPERIENCE:
RATIONALE OR RATIONAUZATION?
Bill D. Bell, Ph. D., Charles L. Robertson, Gregory S. Wagner
This study tests the effectiveness of an experience model in predicting aviation safety behavior. The
elements comprising the model include: (a) flight hours, (b) ratings and flight characteristics, (c) carser
status, and (d) malfunction history. Data were derived from 8 random sample of U.S. pilots in the Fall of
1990 by means ofa survey instrument. Significant variance in aviation safety is not explained by the model.
The key predictor of safety behavior is the career status (i.e., certificste duration) of the pilot. Flight hours,
ratings, and malfunction history are negatively and non-significantly associated with aviation safety. The
research: (a) questions the use of these variables in ex post facto ·explanations· of aviation safety, and (b)
suggests 8 topology for examining safety behavior.
THE PROBLEM IN
PERSPECTIVE
Pilot experience is an ill-defined
variable in aviation safety litera-
ture (Campbell, 1987: Schiff,
1985, 1987; Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association [AOPA],
1987a-b). Although its definition
is frequently unspecified, it
generally refers to the accumu-
lated wisdom attendant upon
involvement in flight activities
(Kershner, 1981. 1985). The
experienced pilot. for example. is
regarded as a good pilot, as a
safe pilot. and as an individual
whose understandings, jUdg-
ments. and actions bespeak
reliable, conscientious behavior.
As an explanatory variable,
however. experience has not
been generally explored from an
empirical standpoint. For the
most part, its nature, composi-
tion, and importance have been
inferred from three sources:
(1) the air transportation
industry
(2) public media
(3) various accident investi-
gation organizations (e.g.,
National Transportation
Safety Board [NTSB),
AOPA. etc.).
Generally speaking. air transpor-
tation employers associate pilot
experience with specified
6
degrees of flight activity (Schiff,
1985, 1987; Taneja, 1989) and,
in this regard, they often require
of employees a certain number
of flight hours, specific ratings,
and exposure to a variety of air-
craft types. This preemployment
criteria assumes that one who
meets these requirements will
exhibit more knowledge of the
field. make sounder safety judg-
ments. and engender greater
confidence in the public mind
than less experienced pilots. In
addition. it is considered that
such individuals are more easily
trained and involve fewer costs
to the company.
The philosophy of air trans-
portation employers is echoed
by the public media and numer-
ous private. federal. and interna-
tional agencies (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], 19n,
1980a-b; 1985b-h; AOPA, 1987a-
b; International Civil Aviation
Organization [ICAO]. 1987a-f).
Perhaps the most frequent
media commentary to follow a
major air catastrophe is the lack
of flight time and aircraft
familiarization of one or more
members of the ill-fated crew.
The same impression can be
gleaned from examination of
NTSB accident statistics (NTSB,
1987a-g). These statistics. like
comments from the public
media. give the impression that
flight experience is a matter of:
(a) accumulated flight time, (b)
time in type. and (c) the recency
of flight activities (e.g.. last 30
days, last 90 days. etc.).
It should be pointed out that.
with the exception of the air
transportation argument as to
the costs involved in pilot
training. all explanations of
aviation safety relative to pilot
experience have been ex post
facto in nature. That is. both
media pronouncements and
accident statistics have
attempted to assess experience
only after tragedies have
occurred. To date. no research
has attempted to examine con-
temporary safety practice with
respect to flight (i.e., pilot)
experience.
The purpose of the present
research is two-fold. The first is
to suggest a theoretical orienta-
tion which can be used to
address the cumulative assump-
tions of pilot experience. Of
interest here is the internalization
of those norms and values
associated with safety practice.
as well as an examination of
factors which strengthen or
diminish these orientations. The
second is to examine pilot
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experience in relation to current
safety practice. Ex post facto
-explanations- afford limited
insight into the matter at hand.
Our first point of departure con-
cerns the extent to which a
continuous or discontinuous
pattern of socialization affects
safety practice.
THE SOCIAUZATION THEORY
AND RESEARCH
HYPOTHESES
Socialization is an interactional
process whereby a person's
behavior is modified to conform
to expectations held by members
of the group to which they
belong or aspire (Hill, 1960;
Brim, 1967). Such behavior in-
cludes not only the process by
which the individual acquires the
ways of persons around him or
her, but also the process by
which an adult takes on behavior
appropriate to the expectations
associated with a new position in
a group (Hill, 1960). Socialization
processes are especially active
each time a person occupies a
new position, as when joining a
fraternity or sorority, being
promoted in a business organi-
zation, becoming a parent, or
being inducted into any special
group (Goode, 1957). In
essence. the socialization
process concerns the attitudinal
and behavioral changes which
occur through learning.
Socialization theorists suggest
that the acquisition of ideas,
beliefs, attitudes, and values is
facilitated by the participatory
integration of the individual into
the group context (Kohlberg,
1963; Ferster and Skinner. 1957;
Goode. 1960). That is. effective
socialization is impossible under
JAAER, Spring 1992
conditions where the individual is
isolated from the system into
which he/she is being socialized.
Frequent interaction, it is argued.
will lead to a more affective
involvement of the participants in
group life.
Socialization is further facili-
tated when the norms and other
expectational aspects of the
group are focused or specific in
nature (Bell. 1968). Generalized
expectations appear to require a
longer interactional commitment
of group members than do those
which are codified or directive in
scope.General-izedexpectations
often involve identification with
specific role models (i.e.• signifi-
cant others), especially models
who can be put in dramatic
focus (Bandura, 1962. 1969;
Bandura et.at. 1963, 1967).
Formalized expectations can be
presented in an instructional
format where conformity can be
more easily assessed (Bell.
1968).
In addition. socialization
effectiveness is increased as the
instructional aspects of group
membership are intensified (Hill,
1960). Increased social and
psychological commitment to the
group situation as well as the
frequency and intensity of social-
ization efforts combine to ground
the individual more completely in
the normative milieu of group life.
Socialization theorists argue that
this greater integration leads to a
more comprehensive identifica-
tion with the group per se
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957;
Kohlberg. 1969). The overall
effect is to make the individual
more susceptible to those social
control mechanisms O.e., positive
Aviation Safety Relative to Pilot Experience
and negative sanctions) which
regulate normative compliance.
Socialization, although influen-
tial in establishing attitudinal and
behavioral predispositions, is not
a unitary process (Merton. 1957).
It functions in an environment of
many social groups with compet-
ing allegiances. Accordingly,
socialization should not be
thought of as molding a person
to a standard social pattem.
Individuals are subjected to
different combinations of sociali-
zation pressures. and they react
differently to them. Consequent-
Iy. socialization processes can
produce distinctive differences.
as well as similarities, among
persons.
Finally. socialization does not
stop at a certain age, but instead
continues throughout life (Brim.
1967). Therefore, lifeexperiences
representing competing group
involvements act to modify or
condition the attitudes. beliefs,
and values as well as behavioral
patterns established earlier.
Socialization theorists posit that
congruence in group experience
provides reinforcement to many
pre-established behavioral
patterns (Gewirtz at.al., 1956).
Generally speaking, patterns of
behavior which rehearse or
dramatize a previously learned
expectation aid in 'ixing- this
dimension in the individual's
behavioral repertoire.
Within the confines of aviation,
continued flight activities may be
seen as calling forth this repeti-
tive dimension. Accordingly.
those respondents with greater
flight experience are expected to
exhibit more consistently positive
safety behavior.
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A corollary is suggested rela-
tive to the above hypothesis. It
must be recalled that socializa-
tion is a group phenomenon.
Within a group context, an
individual is exposed to an
interactional process whereby
behavior is modified to conform
to expectations held by group
members. As has been sugges-
ted, increased integration in the
group elicits a more comprehen-
sive identification with group
members and their normative
expectations for behavior. It
follows that in those instances
where individuals are temporally
or geographically separated from
the group involvement. socializa-
tion effectiveness should be
·diminished.
In the arena of modern avia-
tion. it is possible to differentiate
participants (i.e., pilots) by
means of an avocation/profes-
sion dichotomy. For a significant
number of pilots. flying is inci-
dental to a host of other life
activities. An avocation, as
opposed to a profession. implies
less consistent behavioral invol-
vement. In addition, monetary
compensation is normally
characteristic of the latter rather
than the former. For the avoca-
tional pilot, flight related activities
are more personalized and less
group oriented. The professional
pilot, on the other hand, is not
only compensated for flight, but
performs within the context of a
formal occupation. The profes-
sional's occupational involve-
ment is characterized by
considerable formality, symbolic
identification (e.g., uniforms,
ranks, professional member-
ships, etc.), institutionalized
8
training requirements, and both
formal and informal mechanisms
of social control. From the stand-
point of socialization theory,
opportunities for interactive
identification, behaviors specifi-
city, and expectational rehearsal
should be greater for the profes-
sional pilot. Accordingly, it is
hypothesized that professional
pilots will exhibit more consis-
tently positive safety behavior
than will their avocational
counterparts.
In summary, then, socialization
theory acknowledges the impor-
tance of group and interactional
involvement in the formulation of
attitudes and behavioral expecta-
tions. It describes the manner in
which attitudes, beliefs, and
values are intemalized. It empha-
sizes those factors deemed
essential to successful sociali-
zation. And, within the framework
of the present research, it
suggests a model by means of
which behavioral expression may
be predicted.
THE RESPONDENT
SELECTION PROCESS
The data presented here
comes from a sample of U.S.
registered pilots polled in the late
fall of 1990 by means of a survey
instrument. Procedurally, the
entire population of registered
pilots in the United States was
enumerated as 710,000. Twenty
thousand of the registered pilots
who were non-residents of the
fifty states were sUbsequently
excluded from the model to
maintain a homogenous flying
environment. From the remaining
(N=690,OOO) registered pilots
with U.S. residence, a systematic
selection procedure was used on
the zip code ordered list to
obtain a nationwide representa-
tive sample of 2,500. Survey
questionnaires were mailed to
selected pilots. A total of 959
surveys were received, constitu-
ting a return rate of 38.4%. No
followup measures were
instituted.
The respondents ranged in age
from 18 to 86 years (the mean
age was 43.3 years). Some
51.1% of the respondents were
between 18 and 42 years old.
Occupationally, for 71.4% of the
sample pilots, flying was an
avocational and non-monetarily
compensated activity. Among
this sUbgrouping were farmers,
service workers, and laborers
(24.7%); clerical workers, sales-
men, operatives, and craftsmen
(35.4%); and professional, tech-
nical, and managerial workers
(39.9%). The mean educational
level of the overall sample was
15.4 years, a figure well above
the national average for the
general population. (Cremin,
1988). In addition, 96.5% of the
sample were caucasian; 91.4%
were presently employed; 78.8%
owned their own homes; and
85.5% had learned to fly in a
civilian environment. Finally, the
median annual income was
slightly less than $42,500.
MAJOR VARIABLES AND
RESEARCH FOCUS
Pilot Experience
Pilot experience focuses on the
continuing nature of socializa-
tion and recognizes the fact that
ongoing life experiences act to
modify or condition attitudes,
beliefs, and values as well as
behavior patterns established
earlier. As Gewirtz et al (1956)
JAAER, Spring 1992 3
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points out, congruence in group
experience provides reinforce-
ment to many pre-established
behavioral patterns. Generally
speaking, patterns of behavior
which rehearse or dramatize a
previously leamed expectation
(e.g., safety behavior) should aid
in .,ixing· this dimension in the
individual's behavioral repertoire.
As repetitive behavior is taken to
reflect normative and/or expecta-
tional rehearsal, attention was
focused on the temporal aspects
of this dimension.
For operational purposes, a
panel of 10 aviation educators
was polled to elicit those factors
most indicative of pilot exper-
ience. The factors suggested
included:
(1) flight hours
(2) ratings and flight
classifications
(3) career status
(4) malfunction history
Respondents were asked to
indicate their total flight hours in
all aircraft, the number of ratings
held with respect to all aircraft
classifications, the duration of
their pilot certificates. and an
enumeration of the number and
types of flight malfunctions
experienced over their aviation
careers. These numbers were
totaled in each category and
utilized as indicators of overall
flight (i.e. pilot) experience.
Aviation Safety
From a conceptual standpoint,
aviation safety was considered a
set of socially conditioned
attitudes, beliefs, and values
specific to the arena of flight.
These elements. it is argued, are
internalized to varying degrees
and behaviorally modified by a
variety of social and experiential
components. As SUCh. it can be
viewed as a product of the
socialization process. For the
purposes of this research,
aviation safety constituted a
particular predisposition toward
eliminating human error and its
. attendant consequences in the
aviation environment.
From an operational stand-
point, aviation safety was
assessed by the extent to which
the respondent reported compli-
Aviation Safety Relative to Pilot Experience
ance with fIVe safety-related
behaviors associated with
preflight preparation. These
behaviors included:
(1) the performance of a
thorough walk-around
inspection
(2) a through check of the
weather prior to flight
(3) the computation of fuel
requirements with regard
to appropriate reseNes
(4) the computation of takeoff
and landing distance as
well as runway lengths at
all airports
(5) the use of a checklist for
interior and exterior
inspections
The respondent was presented
a 7-item scale (see Table 1) with
respect to each safety behavior
and asked the extent to which
they perform each item prior to
flight. The scales were anchored
with the bipolar responses
-Never- and -Always·. All
responses were subsequently
totaled to form a Aviation Safety
Index.
Table 1
Preflight Preparation
1. I do a thorough walk-around inspection of an aircraft before I fly It.
2. I check the weather thoroughly before I fly (even on a local flight).
3. I compute fuel requirements with an eye toward a 30 or 45 minute fuel
reserve.
4. I use a check liet for interior and exterior Inspection of an aircraft.
5. I compute takeoff & landing distance, 88 well as runway lengths at
airports of Intended use, for each flight.
JAAER, Spring 1992
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THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A standard multiple regression
was performed. to determine the
effect of pilot experience on
aviation safety. for the Aviation
Safety Index as the dependent
variable (DV) and flight hours.
ratings. career status. and
malfunction history as indepen-
dent variables. Analysis was
performed for evaluation of
assumptions. i.e. that Pilot Safety
Behavior improves with an
increase in pilot experience.
Results of evaluation of
assumptions led to transforma-
tion of the variables to reduce
skewness in their distributions.
reduce the number of outliers.
and improve the normality.
linearity. and homoscedasticity of
residuals. Logarithmic transfor-
mations were used on the
Aviation Safety Index (LOG-
SAFE). Career Status (LOG-
YEAR). Flight Hours (LOGFEXP).
and Malfunction History (LOG-
MALF). One independent vari-
able. Flight Ratings and Classifi-
cations. was positively skewed
without transformation and nega-
tively skewed with it; hence. it
was not transformed. With the
use of a p<.OO1 criterion for
mahalanobis distance. ten out-
liers among the cases were
found and subsequently exclu-
ded. Seven additional cases had
missing data and were deleted
from analysis. Analysis was
limited to the remaining 942
respondents. To detect the
interactive effects of combina-
tions of independent variables;
flight hours. ratings. career
status, and malfunction history;
multicollinearity and singularity
investigations of the independent
variables were performed and
proved negative.
Table 2 displays the correla-
tions between the variables,
comparing the predictors to
determine which one is more
important, using the unstandard-
ized regression coefficients (8)
and intercept, the standardized
regression coefficients (8). the
semipartial correlations(.rt), and
R, RI. and adjusted RI. R for
the regression was not signifi-
cantly different from zero.
F(4,937)=2.21,p<.07, hence the
regression exercise has not
helped to explain the dependent
variable (Aviation Safety Index).
One regression coefficient does
differ significantly from zero.
using a 95%- confidence limit
calculation. The confidence limits
for the Career Status (LOGYEAR)
variable were -0.0321 to -0.0049.
Only one of the independent
variablescontributedsignificantly
to predicting the Aviation Safety
Index, respondent's logarithmical
transformed--career status (....
= .008). The four independent
variables in combination contrib-
uted a .001 in shared variability;
however. altogether only 0.9%
(0.5% adjusted) of the variability
in aviation safety scores was
predicted by knowing scores on
thesefour independentvariables.
Although correlations between
the log of aviation safety and the
logs of flight hours and malfunc-
tions were -.035 and -.036 re-
spectively. neither variable
contributed significantly to
regression. The same was true
of the correlation between log of
aviation safety and flight ratings
and classifications (-.036).
Table 2
Standard MultlDle Rearesslon of Fllaht Variable. on SafetY Behavior IN=942)
LOGSAFE B B sri
Variables (DV) LOGFEXP LOGMALF RATINGS LOGYEAR
LOGFEXP -.035 .0069
LOGMALF -.036 .617 -.0029
RATINGS -.036 .569 .480 -.0012
LOGYEAR -.085 .689 .417 .342 -.0190* -.120 .008
Intercept = 1.466
Means 1.464 2.880 .488 2.379 .976
Standard Devl- .073 .799 .466 1.809 .471 RI= .009*
ations Adjusted RI= .005
R= .097
* p<.01
10
*unique variability = .008; shared variability = .001
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Post hoc evaluation of these
correlations revealed none to be
significantly different from zero
[F(4,937)=1.87, p<.17; F(4,937)
= .204, p<.65; and F(4,937)=
.523, p<.47, respectively]. It
seems clear that flight
experience (i.e., hours, ratings,
and malfunction history) contrib-
ute negligibly (both singularly
and jointly) to variance in
reported safety behavior.
From the results presented in
Table 2, it would appear that the
research hypothesis has not
been confirmed by the data.
Safety behavior is not observed
to be positively associated with
the independent variables in
question. On the contrary, all
correlations are negative.
Although these associations are
not statistically significant, they
relegate to rationalization the
relationship of pilot experience
with imprOVed safety practice.
Table 3, seeking to account for
differences among pilots, shows
Aviation Safety Relative to Pilot Experience
a measure of how different the
Safety Behavior Indices are. It
provides a test of the avocation-
profession corollary conceming
group involvement. As
hypothesized, a statistically
significant difference is obtained
between the aviation safety
scores of avocational (i.e., non-
monetarily compensated) and
professional (i.e., monetarily
compensated) pilots. Individuals
compensated for flight activities
scored higher than did their
Table 3
Analysis of Variance of Safety Behavior Indices for
MonetarilY- and Non-MonetarlJi Compensated Pilots (N=963)
Sum of
Source elf Squares Mean Squares F Level of Significance
Between Groups 1 185.0385 185.0385 9.8355 .0013
Within Groups m 18079.6801 18.8134
Total 962 18264.7186
• Mean = 30.1841; Standard Deviation = 4.3828
b Mean = 29.2157; Standard Deviation =4.3190
avocational counterparts
(F=9.84, p<.001). The implica-
tions for the predictive paradigm
are seen in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 represents a standard
multiple regression of flight
variables on the safety behavior
of avocational O.e., non-monetar-
ily compensated) pilots. Only
one of the independent variables
contributed significantly to
prediction of aviation safety as
logarithmical transformed-flight
ratings and classifications
(8f'2=.006). The four indepen-
dent variables in combination
contributed another .040 in
shared variability. Altogether,
4.6% (4.0% adjusted) of the
variability in aviation safety
scores was predicted by
JAAER, Spring 1992
knowing scores on these four
independent variables.
Although the correlations
between log of aviation safety
and the logs of career status and
flight hours were -.155 and -.174
respectively, neither variable
contributed significantly to
regression. The same was true
of the correlation between log of
aviation safety and the log of
malfunctions (-.160). Post hoc
evaluation of these correlations
revealed none to be significantly
different from zero
[F(4,661)=1.47, p<.23;
F(4,661)=.39. p<.39; and
F(4,661) =2.71, p<.10, respec-
tively]. It seems clear that flight
experience (i.e., hours), career
status, and malfunction history
contribute negligibly (both singu-
larly and jointly) to variance in
safety behavior.
From the results presented in
Table 4. it would again appear
that the research hypothesis has
not been confirmed by the data
Safety behavior among avoca-
tional pilots is not observed to
be positively associated with the
independent variables in ques-
tion. On the contrary, all obser-
ved correlations are negative. In
addition, these relationships fall
short of statistical significance.
Table 5 represents a standard
multiple regression of flight-
variables on the safety behavior
of professional (i.e.. monetarily
compensated) pilots. Only one of
the independent variables contri-
11
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. buted significantly to prediction
of aviation safety as logarithmical
transformed-the log of flight
hours (81'1=.031). The four inde-
pendent variables in combination
contributed another .007 in
shared variability. Altogether,
3.8% (2.3% adjusted) of the vari-
ability in aviation safety scores
was predicted by knowing
scores on these four indepen-
dent variables.
TABLE 4
Standard Munlple Regression of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Non-Monetarily Compensated
Pilots (N=6661
LOGSAFE 8rl
Variables (DV) LOGFEXP LOGMALF RATINGS LOGYEAR B 8 (unique)
LOGFEXP -.174 -.0040
LOGMALF -.160 .488 -.0144
RATINGS -.178 .566 .455 -.0062* -.089 .006
LOGYEAR -.155 .693 .366 .388 -.0095
Intercept = 1.494
Means 1.460 2.600 .295 1.749 .909 RI=
Standard Oevia- .073 .683 .374 1.158 .491 RI= .ow
tions Adjusted R= .040
.214**
* p<.05
** p<.OO1
• unique variability = .006; shared variability = .040
TABLE 5
Standard Multiple Regresalon of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Monetarily Compensated
Pilots (N=2661
LOGSAFE srI
Variables (DV) LOGFEXP LOGMALF RATINGS LOGYEAR B B (unique)
LOGFEXP .157 .0401** .327 .031
LOGMALF .065 .478 -.cXXJ7
RATINGS .010 .179 .455 -.0005
LOGYEAR .065 .828 .366 .166 -.0388
Intercept = 1.3n
Means 1.474 3.579 .295 3.808 1.145
Standard Devia- .070 .571 .374 2.055 .360 RI = .038·
tions Adjusted RI = .023
R= .194*
* p<.05
** p<.OO1
• unique variability = .031; shared variability = -rXJ7
Although the correlation
between log of aviation safety
and log of career status was
12
.067, career status did not contri-
bute significantly to regression.
The same was true of the corre-
lations with the log of malfunc-
tions and ratings (.065 and .010.
respectively). Post hoc evalua-
JAAER, Spring 1992
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tions of these correlations
revealed neither to be signifi-
cantly different from zero
[F(4,261)= 3.3S,p<.07; F(4,261)
=.004, p<.95; and F(4,261)
=.057, p<.81, respectively]. It
seems clear that career status,
flight hours, and malfunction
history contribute negligibly
(both singularly and jointly) to
variance in safety behavior.
From observation of Table 5.
it would appear that only one
aspect of the research hypo-
thesis has been confirmed by
the data. Specifically, those
respondents indicating greater
flight hours exhibited more
consistently positive safety
behavior (p<.01). Although the
effects of career status, flight
ratings, and malfunction history
are in predicted directions, the
.associations are not statistically
significant.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
From the perspective of the
present data. little variance in
aviation safety was explained by
the socialization model. With no
exceptions, the associates were
contrary to prediction. Most,
however, were neither strong nor
statistically significant. It would
appear that aviation safety can
not be adequately adduced from
a knowedge of a pilot'S flight
hours, career status, ratings, or
malfunction history.
A second finding of this
research was the suggestion of
group specificity with respect to
aviation safety. That is, when
pilots were differentiated into
avocational and professional
categories, the model proved
JAAER. Spring 1992
somewhat more useful. Safety
index scores were found to be
significantly higher for profes-
sional or monetariIy-compen-
sated pilots than for their
avocational peers (F=9.84,
p<.OO1). For the professional
pilots, 3.8% of the variance in
aviation safety was accounted for
by the model. Whereas all model
assumptions were borne out by
the data, only the respondents'
flight hours proved statistically
significant. Careerstatus, ratings,
and malfunction history were
positively but non-significantly
associated with aviation safety
(.07, .01, and .07, respectively).
For avocational or non-mone-
tarily compensated pilots, on the
other hand, 4.6% of the variance
in aviation safety was accounted
for by the model. Whereas all
variables were found to be nega-
tively associated with aviation
safety, only the pilot's ratings
and classifications proved statis-
tically significant. As in the case
of the total sample, the associa-
tions between flight variables
and aviation safety were nega-
tive. In general, it would appear
that these elements provide
insufficient rationale for safety
behavior.
UMITATIONS AND RESEARCH
SUGGESTIONS
The present research is not
without its limitations. The defini-
tion of aviation safety is a case in
point. From a theoretical per-
spective, aviation safety encom-
passes both attitudinal and
behavioral elements. That is, the
individual'spredispositiontoward
error avoidance includes not only
Aviation Safety Relative to Pilot Experience
a repertoire of situation-specific
behaviors, but also numerous
understandings (i.e., beliefs) and
feelings about safety practice. In
the present research, only the
behavioral dimension was
addressed. In addition, attention
was limited to those behaviors
characteristic of a specific flight
situation (i.e., preflight) as
opposed to those consistent with
a complete flight scenario-pre-
flight, flight, and post-flight. It
seems clear that a more compre-
hensive test of the socialization
model must incorporate not only
a broader range of safety beha-
vior, but must include cognitive
and affective elements as well.
Secondly, the operationaliza-
tion of pilot experience must be
expanded. In this research. pilot
experience centered about flight
activities. SUbsequent research
into pilot behavior indicates not
only the multifaceted character of
pilot experience, but also its
social-psychological dimensions.
(Bellet.al., 1991a,b,c). Individuals
who view themselves as good
pilots. for example. tend to be
more conscientious in terms of
safety behavior. In this regard, it
is suggested that subsequent
research address an individual's
aviation-related attitudes, beliefs,
and values as well as hours,
ratings. 'etc., in assessing pilot
experience.
Finally, the present data are
associated with a cross-sectional
design. As such, they represent
only a snapshot in time. To
assess changes in behavior over
time. a, longitudinal format would
be desirable.-
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